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Non-technical summary
Telecommunication infrastructure availability at an adequate quality level has consid-
erably changed communication habits since the 1990s. The physical infrastructure and
its quality are the key pre-requisites for higher-level service infrastructure (such as the
internet) or offered services (such as SMS or telephony). Consequently, telecommunica-
tion infrastructure, investment incentives and the effect of service level competition have
gained importance in economic research. Although new technologies demand an active
usage of infrastructure by customers offering own information and services (Web 2.0),
only a low number of infrastructure providers shoulder investment costs and investment
risks. Therefore, it becomes more and more difficult for infrastructure providers to in-
ternalize the value added for customers by the provision of a high-quality infrastructure.
This paper analyzes whether and how the demand for infrastructure affects infrastruc-
ture provision. So far, the empirical literature assumes investments to be only driven
by supply side characteristics. Thus, service level competition is considered as a di-
rect driver for infrastructure provision. However, it is ignored that service competition
increases information supply which requires an adequate level of infrastructure. Conse-
quently, service competition should also have an impact on infrastructure demand and,
thus, should indirectly affect infrastructure investments.
In a two-equation model, I disentangle service competition as a driver for infrastructure
demand and as a driver for infrastructure supply and compare the results of the simul-
taneous estimation approach with the standard closed-form approach, i.e. when the
indirect effect of competition is ignored. I do this exercise both for fix-line infrastructure
and for mobile infrastructure and show that the impact of competition on investments
is downward-biased when the demand side is ignored.
Moreover, I also analyze cross-effects between fix-line and mobile infrastructures. While
the demand for fix-line infrastructure is found to be independent of the demand for mo-
bile infrastructure, the demand for mobile infrastructure depends on fix-line infrastruc-
ture demand. Similarly, mobile investments depend on fix-line investments but fix-line
investments are found to be independent. While fix-line infrastructure is installed at a
point in time without a competitive infrastructure being already in place, mobile supply
and also mobile demand depend on the fix-line market situation. These findings support
the idea of asymmetric substitutability effects between competitive infrastructures in
European telecommunication markets.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Die Verfügbarkeit von Telekommunikationsinfrastruktur adäquater Qualität hat seit
Ende der 1990er Jahre zu einer erheblichen Veränderung von Verhaltensmustern in
der Kommunikation beigetragen. Die physische Infrastruktur und ihre Qualität gelten
als zentrale Voraussetzung für die Qualität von aufgesetzten Infrastrukturen (Internet)
oder Dienstleistungen (SMS, Sprachtelefonie). Aus diesem Grund hat die Untersuchung
der Telekommunikationsinfrastruktur, die Anreizsetzung für Investitionen und insbeson-
dere auch der Einfluss von Dienste-Wettbewerb für Investitionen im wissenschaftlichen
Umfeld besondere Bedeutung erlangt. Obwohl neue Technologien eine immer stärkere
Einbindung von Nachfragern als aktive Nutzer der Infrastruktur begründen, die Inhalte
bereitstellen und Dienste und Informationen aktiv anbieten (Stichwort Web 2.0), werden
Investitionskosten und -risiken nur von einigen wenigen Infrastrukturanbietern getragen.
Für die wenigen Infrastrukturanbieter wird es kontinuierlich schwieriger, den durch die
Infrastruktur geschaffenen Mehrwert zu internalisieren.
Dieses Papier untersucht, ob und in welchem Umfang die Nachfrage nach Infrastruktur
einen Einfluss auf deren Bereitstellung hat. Bislang wird in der empirischen Forschung
davon ausgegangen, dass Investitionen (nur) durch anbieterseitige Faktoren bestimmt
werden. Daher wird Wettbewerb auf der Diensteebene als direkter Einflussfaktor für das
Infrastrukturangebot unterstellt. Dienstewettbewerb führt allerdings zu einer Steigerung
der Informationsbereitstellung, was wiederum die Verfügbarkeit einer hinreichenden In-
frastrukturqualität voraussetzt. Daher sollte Wettbewerb auf der Diensteebene auch die
Nachfrage nach Infrastruktur bedingen und daher einen indirekten Effekt auf Investitio-
nen haben.
In einem 2-Gleichungssystem unterscheide ich die Bedeutung von Dienstewettbewerb als
Einflussfaktor für das Infrastrukturangebot und die Infrastrukturnachfrage. Ich verglei-
che die Schätzergebnisse eines strukturellen Schätzansatzes, der die Nachfrage in der In-
vestitionsgleichung endogenisiert, mit den Ergebnissen von unabhängigen Schät-
zungen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine Unterschätzung der Bedeutung von Dienstewett-
bewerb auf Investitionen, wenn man die Nachfragerseite vernachlässigt.
In einem weiteren Schritt wird die Beziehung zwischen Festnetz- und Mobilfunkinfra-
struktur untersucht. Während die Nachfrage nach Festnetzinfrastruktur unabhängig
von der Nachfrage nach Mobilfunkinfrastruktur ist, hängt die Nachfrage nach Mobil-
funkinfrastruktur von der Nachfrage nach Festnetzzugang ab. Ähnliches ist bei Mo-
bilfunkinvestitionen bezüglich Festnetzinvestitionen zu beobachten. Während Festnetz-
infrastruktur zu einem Zeitpunkt installiert wird, zu dem noch keine vergleichbare
Mobilfunk-Übertragungstechnologie zur Verfügung steht, hängen Mobilfunk-Nachfrage
und -Angebot von der Festnetzsituation ab. Diese Ergebnisse bestätigen eine asym-
metrische Substituierbarkeit zwischen Festnetz- und Mobilfunkinfrastruktur in europä-
ischen Telekommunikationsmärkten.
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1 Introduction
Telecommunication markets have entered their second fundamental phase of restructur-
ing during the last couple of years. Until the end of the 1990s, telecommunication mar-
kets were provider-driven markets with fully integrated monopolistic providers. These
providers decided about the quality of services and even the services themselves. As more
and more services evolve with the installation of more recent transmission technologies1,
the profit from infrastructure provision and the profit from service provision continu-
ously diverge. Simultaneously, the role of service users turned from a passive to an active
role as users demand for adequate infrastructure which is necessary for higher-quality
services. Moreover, with Web 2.0, users even start to provide services themselves and use
peer-to-peer platforms, which requires symmetric or at least higher bandwidth accesses
in the near future.2 The demand for high-quality infrastructure increases as physical
infrastructure turns from an originally provider-determined to a customer-determined
product and infrastructure providers and regulators have to contemplate how to handle
this fundamental restructuring. This issue is even more striking when taking into ac-
count the steps implemented by the European Parliament in coordination with national
governments to install the Third Regulatory Package.3 It is therefore most relevant to
know more about how the market structure and service competition influence invest-
ments, how the transition from one market structure to another affects the supply and,
in particular, the demand for infrastructure and how they interact. With this paper, I
want to provide some more insights into these aspects by analyzing the first structural
change in telecommunication markets from former monopolistic to competitive markets.
Closed-form models are the standard approach chosen in the literature to explain the im-
pact of service competition on infrastructure provision. However, this approach ignores
potential indirect effects of competition on the demand for infrastructure. For taking into
account such indirect effects, I estimate an equation system for infrastructure supply and
infrastructure demand as recommended in Röller and Waverman (2001). Such a more
structural approach separates demand-related impact variables from supply-related ones
and considers how competition and other explanatory variables of standard closed-form
models affect the supply side or the demand side, respectively.
1Examples are internet platforms like Ebay, search engines like Google, MMS and mobile internet
access.
2Examples are video platforms like YouTube or social networks like Facebook.
3http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/tomorrow/reform/better_
regulation_directive/st03677_re06.en09.pdf
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In doing so, I find service competition increasing infrastructure investments both in fix
and in mobile markets. However, competition does not directly affect investments, i.e.
I find no or only weakly significant supply-side effects of competition on investments.
Instead, competition influences the demand for infrastructure which then affects invest-
ments.
Taking into account cross effects between fix and mobile infrastructure markets, I find
that higher mobile prices lead to a lower demand for mobile infrastructure but to a
higher demand for fix infrastructure access. On the other hand, no such effect is found
the other way round. Similarly, the supply of mobile infrastructure depends on the sit-
uation in fix infrastructure markets but not vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, a short overview over the literature on
investments in telecommunication infrastructure and competition is provided. Section 3
describes the main changes in European telecommunication infrastructure markets and
derives three hypotheses, which are either based on the observation of the European
situation or which are based on findings in the literature. Section 4 explains the esti-
mation models and introduces the underlying database. In Section 5, estimation results
are displayed and discussed in more detail. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Studies on Telecommunication
Infrastructure Supply and Demand
Since the liberalization of European telecommunication markets, telecommunication in-
frastructure is in the focus of an ongoing political debate. In particular with the con-
sideration of open access, the question of adequate infrastructure quantity and quality
is a central issue on the agenda of infrastructure providers, politicians and also user
associations. Despite the huge political relevance, there is still a very low number of pa-
pers addressing the debate from an empirical perspective and nearly no paper analyzes
the interplay of infrastructure supply and demand. In this short review, I concentrate
on papers, which take up the question of infrastructure provision, and papers, which
address the topic of infrastructure demand and customers’ choice between alternative
infrastructures from an empirical perspective.
The seminal paper of Röller and Waverman (2001) provides the basic estimation frame-
work of this paper. The authors analyze the impact of infrastructure provision on
economic performance measures for a selection of OECD countries. In doing so, they
find a significant impact of the availability of telecommunication infrastructure on GDP,
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which is not linear. Moreover, due to network effects in the telecommunication sector,
they identify a critical level of telecommunication infrastructure, above which increasing
returns on GDP growth exist. While Röller and Waverman consider telecommunica-
tion infrastructure as a driver of economic growth, the following papers concentrate on
telecommunication market performance itself.
In a cross-country study of multiple African and South American countries, Wallsten
(2001) analyzes how infrastructure liberalization and privatization affect investment pat-
terns. He identifies a positive correlation between mainline competition and connection
capacity. However, for privatization, no positive effect on competition exists. In a sub-
sequent study, Wallsten takes a closer look at the sequence of privatization and deregu-
lation (Wallsten, 2002) and concludes that the sequence significantly affects the perfor-
mance of telecommunication markets. If regulation follows privatization, this structure
decreases market concentration and market power of the former monopolistic firm more
than the other way round.
Henisz and Zelner (2001) also analyze the role of the government on telecommunication
market performance. They focus on how countries can close the gap to other countries
with a more advanced telecommunication infrastructure in place since, in line with Röller
and Waverman (2001), telecommunication infrastructure is assumed to be the central
pre-requisite for economic performance. Henisz and Zelner argue that the catch-up of
less developed countries should not only be based on the economic characteristics of a
country. Moreover, they find that governmental interventions to coordinate and support
the development are a key aspect, which determines the speed of catching-up.
In contrast to the previous papers, Heimeshoff (2007) uses a data set of developed coun-
tries. He considers the main drivers of telecommunication investments, adopting a time
series approach for a selection of OECD countries and identifies market concentration
as a driver of infrastructure investments. Moreover, Heimeshoff includes an indicator of
governmental and democracy drivers (comprising measures for the procedure of govern-
ment election or alternative types of civil rights) and finds that "more democracy" has
a significantly positive impact on investments in telecommunication infrastructure.
The paper of Grajek and Röller (2009) is one of the first studies in which a firm-level
data set is employed. Using a new regulatory index, the Plaut Economics Regulatory
Index4, they analyze the effect of regulation on investments for a database of European
4See Zenhäusern et al. (2007) for a more detailed description.
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telecommunication companies. By controlling for endogeneity of regulation with vari-
ous instrumental variables, including political variables and levels of regulation in other
European countries, they identify a negative effect of regulation on investments.
Besides the consideration of supply-side aspects and the performance of infrastructure
deployment, a number of papers address a demand-related topic of infrastructure avail-
ability, the substitutability between fix-line and mobile services and fix-line and mobile
infrastructure. While particularly in developed countries at least basic fix-line infras-
tructure access is available, the major issue lies on an upcoming new infrastructure and
the substitutability between the quality of fix-line and mobile access lines.
Rodini et al. (2003) apply an empirical analysis for a U.S. household survey, in which
they consider access substitutability between mobile access and second fix lines.5 By
estimating cross-price elasticities, they find that both access modes are selected substitu-
tively. Following the authors, substitutability has a strong impact on policies concerning
the restructuring of a fix-line network.
In contrast to Rodini et al., Hamilton (2003) considers the role of infrastructure sub-
stitutability and complementarity for developing countries. She points out that in this
context, substitutability and complementarity depend on a country’s economic develop-
ment. Particularly in less developed countries with a lower roll-out of fix-line infrastruc-
ture, mobile access is a substitute to fix-line access. In countries with an existing fix-line
infrastructure, mobile access could also be complementary to fix access lines. Moreover,
at a state of lower fix-line roll-out, the introduction of mobile infrastructure increases
the competitive pressure on fix-line providers to extend fix-line infrastructure.
To the best of my knowledge, Röller and Waverman (2001) is the only empirical paper
which takes into consideration both the supply side and the demand side of infras-
tructure. Papers based on infrastructure supply on a country-level aggregation mainly
consider fix-line and mobile investments in general but ignore differences in supply pat-
terns of the two infrastructures.6 In contrast, papers on telecommunication demand
mainly ignore the challenge of infrastructure availability and investments. I try to close
5The authors argue that the first fix-line access is the standard access. Households increase availability
either by a second fix-line access or by a cellular phone access. While a second fix-line access is only
available at home, it particularly guarantees a higher transmission rate for internet access.
6Grajek and Röller (2009) use data on the company level and control for fix-to-mobile differences in
their model.
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this gap by considering both the supply side and the demand side using an equation sys-
tem of supply and demand to check, which factors are drivers of supply and/or demand.
Moreover, I undertake the analysis for fix-line and mobile markets separately accounting
for cross effects between the two infrastructures.
3 Infrastructure Supply and Demand with Platform
Competition
In European countries, mainly two telecommunication infrastructures are installed which
carry, to a far extent, identical services. While a basic fix-line infrastructure has been
available for all households, mobile communication was established during the 1990s
and is still on an ongoing growth path today. In consequence, the change from one
infrastructure to two infrastructures affects the demand for services provided on the
infrastructures and also the demand for infrastructure itself. Simultaneously, new trans-
mission technologies and also new infrastructures were installed to increase capacity and,
thus, to increase quality both in fix-line and in mobile markets. While the additional
infrastructure capacity enables a higher quantity and a higher quality of services, the
initiator for investments is unclear. In particular, the role of service competition for
infrastructure investments with two competing access modes is of regulatory relevance
due to comprehensive externalities provided by infrastructure availability.
In most economic studies on infrastructure supply, i.e. investments, a closed-form ap-
proach is chosen, which assumes demand for infrastructure being independent of other
drivers of investments. On the other hand, when analyzing demand aspects like substi-
tutability of infrastructure and how the demand for one infrastructure affects the demand
for another infrastructure, the supply side has mainly been ignored. The consideration
of both supply and demand simultaneously is particularly relevant when analyzing ma-
jor structural changes either stemming from comprehensive technological deployments
or from substantial changes in market structures, such as "shocks" to the markets.
During the 1990s until 2007, the European telecommunication sector has experienced a
major change in terms of market structures from former monopolistic markets to com-
petition. Moreover, the installation of mobile infrastructure and, thus, the availability
of mobile services affected also the demand for fix-line infrastructure. As stated in the
first proposal of the Second Regulatory Package, the new situation in market structures
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induced major adjustments in terms of transmission technology such as the introduc-
tion of broadband and the switch from GSM to UMTS technology.7 While closed-form
models consider whether there exists an effect of such market-structural or technological
changes on investments, multi-equation estimation approaches allow to consider how this
affects the interplay of supply and demand. By employing a more structural estimation
approach, we are able to separate key drivers for changes in infrastructure demand from
key drivers for changes in supply. Moreover, cross-infrastructure effects can additionally
be considered. This provides more detailed insights into how alternative factors work
together in situations of structural and also technological changes.
Figure 1: Infrastructure Supply and Demand in the EU-15, Norway and Switzerland
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A first impression whether the fundamental changes in ownership and market struc-
tures have had an impact on infrastructure supply and demand could be derived from
7The technological change is one reason among others for the introduction of the Second Reg-
ulatory Package as stated in an EC communication: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/
infosoc/telecompolicy/en/com2000-239en.htm#_Toc478275739
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Figure 1. Total supply is represented by total investments in telecommunication infras-
tructure deflated to 1990 using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Demand is separated
into demand for fix-line access, i.e. the number of standard fix lines, and demand for
mobile, i.e. the number of subscribers.
Ambiguous explanations exist for the impact of service competition on infrastructure
provision. On the one hand, more service competition triggers the provision of more
and higher-quality infrastructure as service providers require a high level of infrastruc-
ture capacity to distinguish from each other in service competition. Thus, the demand
for infrastructure motivates infrastructure operators to invest (an argument brought
forward by the EC based on comparisons with the United States). On the other hand,
service competition might also have an investment-reducing effect due to too low ex-
pected returns on investments. Service competition is mostly Bertrand-like competition
(with differentiated products). Therefore, tougher competition reduces the rents which
could be extracted by the infrastructure provider and, thus, reduces the incentive to
invest (Aghion and Howitt, 1992, or Heimeshoff, 2007).
Employing data for EU-15 markets as well as Norway and Switzerland allows for a com-
parison of these hypotheses under a common regulatory regime and market structural
background. Figure 1 provides evidence that aggregated total investments across all
countries follow a long-run investment circle. The increase in total investments after
1994 slowed down around 1997 but afterwards strongly accelerated until 1999, which
is in line with the introduction of competition. Even after the investment increase was
interrupted by the burst of the IT bubble, deflated investments did not fall below the
level of 1994 anymore due to the technological development.8 These graphical findings
are in line with the interpretation of the EC. Following Commissioner Viviane Reding,
a positive effect of service competition on investments should be expected.9
H1: Upcoming service competition initiates telecommunication infrastructure
supply.
Turning to the demand for infrastructure (proxied by the number of access lines in
Figure 1), mobile subscription follows the expected S-shape relation known from the lit-
erature on network-based markets (see e.g. Cabral, 1990; Grajek, 2003). Moreover, the
8Non-deflated investments even increased slowly.
9See e.g.
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/reding/docs/speeches/brussels_20070321.pdf
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development is of particular interest as, from the standard theoretical approaches, we
should have expected a concave functional form after around 1999, but we observe a sec-
ond acceleration in demand. This new acceleration is driven by technological upgrades,
as around 2000/2001, UMTS licences were allocated. The subsequent European-wide
upgrade from GSM-based infrastructure to UMTS-based infrastructure was mainly moti-
vated by the provision of higher-quality services, which demand for mobile "broadband"
internet access.10
A similar but much weaker increase in demand is found with the fix access curve. While
there is a stagnation of growth between 1997 and 2001, the upward orientation continues
afterwards, which is also based on the demand for higher-quality services in line with
broadband infrastructure. The latest OECD Communications Outlook (2009) describes
the increase in fix-line and mobile service quality and the extensive price reductions as
the results of upcoming competition.
H2: Upcoming service competition increases the (derived) demand for
telecommunication infrastructure of adequate quality and, thus, increases in-
frastructure supply.
While the first two hypotheses consider infrastructure supply and demand separately,
I now turn to cross effects of fix-line and mobile infrastructure supply and demand. A
central issue, which has been frequently discussed in the literature, is the topic of sub-
stitutability between infrastructures. Mobile and fix access lines are considered to be
either complements or substitutes with regard to services and with regard to infrastruc-
ture itself (Rodini et al., 2003; Hamilton, 2003; Sugolov, 2005; or Plank, 2005). Evidence
for both outcomes is found in dependence of the underlying data set. Until the critical
mass for a new substitutive network is reached, this network strongly depends on the
already existing network. Therefore, the established network is a complement for the
newer alternative and probably also the other way around. Nevertheless, if the newer
network has reached its critical mass of users, both networks (might) get substitutes.
In European countries, basic fix-line infrastructure access must be accessible for house-
holds at an affordable price due to Directive 1998/10/EC and the subsequent Universal
Service Directive (2002/22/EC). Even before the liberalization, national laws already
guaranteed access to public telecommunication networks. Therefore, most households
10Note that UMTS was not the first technology for mobile internet access. Nevertheless, it is the most
advanced at the time of its introduction.
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had access to fix-line infrastructure already at the beginning of the observation period.
In contrast, mobile subscription is not covered by the Universal Service Directive or
national laws. Moreover, following Rodini et al. (2003) and the fix-line and the mobile
demand development in Figure 1, customers take mobile access as a secondary access
mode. As fix access has been less expensive, mobile access is no substitute when cus-
tomers decide about the first fix access. In contrast, a secondary fix access has been a
substitute to mobile access during the phase of mobile-infrastructure roll-out.11
H3a: Due to fix-line availability, customers demand more fix-line access when
mobile access is more expensive. However, due to its novelty, the demand for
mobile access is only weakly affected by lower fix-access prices.
Turning to the supply side, the technological lag of mobile infrastructure capacity enables
fix-line infrastructure upgrade decisions to be independent of mobile infrastructure pro-
vision. In contrast, mobile infrastructure is a follower technology and therefore depends
on the fix-line infrastructure quality and the access price.
H3b: The more fix-line infrastructure is provided/the lower the price for fix-
line access, the less mobile infrastructure investments are implemented. In
contrast, no reverse effect exists due to a first-mover advantage of fix-line
infrastructure capacity.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I first derive a model to analyze the interrelationship of supply and de-
mand for fix-line and mobile infrastructure. Afterwards, I provide a descriptive consid-
eration of the data and give a short overview of the necessary adjustments of investment
data and the resulting pitfalls to be taken into account when interpreting the estimation
results.
4.1 Econometric Model
Two complementary equations are used to characterize supply and demand of telecom-
munication infrastructure. Supply is determined as infrastructure investment. The
11Please note that due to new contract structures and higher-quality mobile services, fix and mobile
accesses have become closer substitutes to each other today than during the observation period.
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higher investments are, the "more" infrastructure is provided or the higher is the ca-
pacity of the existing infrastructure. Infrastructure expansions, in particular backbone
investments, reduce congestion on the available infrastructure. In consequence, infras-
tructure investments either lead to an expansion in terms of geographical reach or in
terms of quality of the existing infrastructure.
While Röller and Waverman (2001) concentrate on the impact of telecommunication
infrastructure on GDP and, therefore, instrument infrastructure using supply and de-
mand functions, I want to analyze the determinants of infrastructure supply and demand
themselves and specify the supply function in more detail using approaches provided in
more recent literature (Henisz and Zellner, 2001; Wallsten, 2001, and Wallsten, 2002;
Heimeshoff, 2007). Infrastructure supply is described by the following equation:
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Investments inv are assumed to be a function of access prices access price, the num-
ber of mainlines in operation per households (number of mobile subscribers per capita)
access
pop
, entrants’ market shares in the fix-line or the mobile market comp and the follow-
ing control variables: population characteristics pop like the population, GDP per capita
and the share of urban population as a measure of population concentration, the public
ownership share pub, the costs of capital, int. rate, trend variables time and country
control variables country.
Unfortunately, no public information is accessible on the telecommunication capital stock
in European countries. It is proposed in the literature to calculate the capital stock based
on the number of mainlines, i.e. the number of accesses to the telecommunication infras-
tructure. However, mainlines are a measure of infrastructure demand as customers ask
for the installation. Thus, mainlines are not installed without customers’ desire to do
so. I therefore refrain from using mainlines as a measure of provided infrastructure and
rather apply the share of mainlines in operation per households (mobile subscribers per
capita) as a measure of infrastructure demand (see below).12
Cadot et al. (2006) use the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) to calculate infrastruc-
ture stocks. They allocate information on a cross-regional infrastructure stock based
on the average past-years investment shares. However, such an approach can hardly
12Moreover, additional criticisms are brought forward in the literature (see e.g. Wallsten, 2001) as main-
lines cover only the last-mile infrastructure but do not measure backbone capacity and availability.
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be adopted to markets which are subject to comprehensive technological deployments.
Moreover, no data are available for the time period before 1990 (even no mainline fig-
ures for all EU-15 countries). Thus, a starting level for the European telecommunication
capital stock can hardly be calculated.13
As infrastructure investments tie up capital in the long-run, it is important to control
for the long-run costs of capital. I include interest rates based on 10-years government
bonds which are expected to have a negative impact on infrastructure supply but no
effect on demand.
Usually, infrastructure demand is assumed to be exogenously given in closed-form mod-
els. It either enters the estimation equation as a proxy for existing infrastructure or
it is ignored. However, taking demand as an exogenous variable neglects the impact
of service competition and other variables on demand. Standard approaches in the
literature estimate the effect of alternative impact factors on infrastructure provision
with closed-form investment models. These models implicitly assume a black-box struc-
ture with regard to the interplay of infrastructure supply and demand and ignore any
interactions of infrastructure demand characteristics and service competition. By giving
a more structural form to demand, I try to disentangle this black box.
Röller and Waverman (2001) express infrastructure demand as the number of main-
lines in operation. I adopt this measure for fix-line access and, correspondingly, use the
number of mobile subscribers as the measure for mobile infrastructure demand.14 The
dependent demand variable differs from the demand specification in Röller and Waver-
man (2001) in the sense that they construct demand as the sum of per-capita access
and the per-capita waiting list for infrastructure access. I ignore the waiting-list term
as it is stated in the OECD Communications Outlook 2001 that the waiting time and,
thus, the number of customers waiting for infrastructure availability is negligible for the
period since about 1990 (p. 211 and Table 8.1). Moreover, it is stressed that due to this
fact most countries have even stopped listing waiting time (Table 8.2).
Using a measure based on the number of mainlines or mobile subscribers for infrastruc-
ture demand holds some pitfalls, firstly, as it excludes the individual quantity of usage
and, secondly, as it ignores quality differences. However, infrastructure usage and the
13Grajek and Röller (2009) employ data on the company level and, therefore, proxy the infrastructure
stock based on financial data.
14Röller and Waverman only consider (fix) mainlines as mobile telephony is of no interest for the period
of their model.
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quality level of the access mode relate to the services provided on the lines and do not
necessarily express the singular demand for access lines.15
The demand equation therefore has the following structure:
log
accesst,i
popt,i
= αdt,i + β
d
accprlog(access pricet,i) + β
d
acclog
accesst−1,i
popt−1,i
+ βdcompcompt,i
+log(popt,i)
′βdpop + β
d
publog(pubt,i) + β
d
int. ratelog(int. ratet,i)
+βdtimetime+ country
′
t,iβ
d
country + 
d
t,i
(2)
I assume a very similar structure for supply and demand as no information about drivers
of infrastructure demand could be found in the literature. By adopting an equation sys-
tem for supply and demand, I use the variables typically provided in the literature to
affect infrastructure investments and consider whether they better explain supply or
demand or even both.16 Simultaneous-estimation methods allow for such a specification
as the common variance-covariance matrix accounts for correlations between the error
terms as well as endogenous variables and the exogenous variables of the two equations.
While infrastructure demand enters the supply equation, I include the one period lagged
demand into the demand equation as a customer’s decision about infrastructure demand
is a singular decision and is not changed every period. Thus, the demand for infrastruc-
ture in period t should strongly depend on infrastructure demand in period t− 1. I also
include a price approximation for infrastructure access, which is the total infrastructure
revenue per access, access price, as is done in Röller and Waverman (2001). Unfor-
tunately, there is no consistent information about access prices due to highly distinct
pricing methods across countries and due to repeated adjustments of access price calcu-
lations in individual EU member states.
For analyzing whether substitutive effects exist between fix-line and mobile infrastruc-
ture, I additionally include mobile revenues per subscriber in the fix-line supply function
and fix-line revenues per mainline in the mobile supply function. Similarly, I include the
number of mainlines in operation per household in the mobile demand equation and the
number of mobile subscribers per capita in the fix-line demand equation.
15For the analysis of infrastructure quality differences, alternative measures such as broadband avail-
ability or UMTS technology subscriptions could be used. Nevertheless, this is not the aim of the
analysis in this paper.
16Thus, the results of my estimations provide more information of how one could specify infrastructure
supply and demand.
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4.2 Data Description and Data Adjustments
Data Sources
I apply data aggregated on the country level for the EU-15 countries as well as Norway
and Switzerland between 1990 and 2007. Data are mainly taken from OECD sources,
which include information from the biannual OECD Communications Outlooks (1999,
2001, 2009). Additionally, I also use data from the OECD International Regulation
Database about regulation and competition and information from SourceOECD and
Eurostat on long-run interest rates. Population concentration data is taken from the
UNECE website.
Data Description
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used in the analysis for the first and the last
year of the observation period as well as for 1998 as this is the year of the transposition
of the EC directives to national laws in most EU member states. All financial variables
are deflated using the CPI 1990 and are expressed in US Dollars (USD) for reasons of
comparison between countries.
The strong reduction in fix-line infrastructure investments and the simultaneous increase
in mobile infrastructure investments is mainly due to the ongoing increase in mobile roll-
out during the observation period. While total investments decreased from nearly 2650m
USD in 1990 to about 2290m USD in 2007 in a cyclical move, the share dedicated to
mobile investments increased.
Concerning the demand for infrastructure access, the aggregated figures correspond to
the graphs in Figure 1. A weak increase in the demand for fix-line access and a very
strong increase in the demand for mobile access during the observation period is ob-
served. Figures on the relative change in demand provide some descriptive impression
of the slope of the demand curves. The relative change in fix access lines experienced
a weak downward slope between 1993 and 1999 but afterwards continuously increased
at a low rate. Concerning the relative change in the number of mobile subscribers, a
strong increase exists which corresponds to the slope of the demand curve as seen in
Figure 1. Nevertheless, with a higher number of mobile subscribers, the relative change
in mobile subscriptions slows down. While fix-line and also mobile revenue per access re-
mained at a nearly constant level or even decreased during the first half of the observation
16
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
1990 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Fix Investments (m) 2601.5 3261.8 442183 10344.0 17
Mobile Investments (m) 47.0 51.9 0 198.4 17
Fix Access/Pop. 0.456 0.114 0.240 0.689 17
Mobile Access/Pop. 0.015 0.018 0 0.054 17
Rel. Change Fix Lines* 3.7 2.6 0.4 11.8 17
Rel. Change Mobile Lines* 29.1 14.0 11.6 53.1 16
Fix Rev./Acc.* 706.9 192.1 453.4 1190.3 14
Mob. Rev./Acc.* 188.8 620.1 5.9 2429.4 15
Population (mill.) 21053.0 22886.1 378.4 62063 17
GDP/Pop. 21235.6 7639.8 7150.9 34363.5 17
Share Urban Population 72.2 12.3 47.9 96.4 17
Long-Run Interest Rate 0.111 0.025 0.065 0.154 15
Fix Market Share Entrant 0.471 1.940 0 8 17
Mobile Market Share Entrant 3.5 10.1 0 37 17
Gov. Share Fix Inc. 93.2 19.3 35 100 17
Gov. Share Mob. Inc. 93.2 19.3 35 100 17
# Fix Prov. > 1 5.9 24.3 0 100 17
# Mob. Prov. > 1 17.6 39.3 0 100 17
* 1991
1998 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Fix Investments (m) 1576.6 1711.1 16.2 4987.6 17
Mobile Investments (m) 735.6 700.3 9.3 2062.5 17
Fix Access/Pop. 0.511 0.079 0.386 0.688 17
Mobile Access/Pop. 0.291 0.116 0.170 0.554 17
Rel. Change Fix Lines -1.8 6.1 -17.4 5.1 17
Rel. Change Mobile Lines 40.0 10.8 19.1 54.4 17
Fix Rev./Acc. 764.9 254.5 253.9 1405.2 17
Mob. Rev./Acc. 104.5 41.6 45.7 218.3 17
Population (mill.) 22617.7 25579.9 419 82035 17
GDP/Pop. 26162.0 8713.3 11726.4 46181.4 17
Share Urban Population 73.6 11.8 53.1 97.0 17
Long-Run Interest Rate 0.050 0.011 0.030 0.085 16
Fix Market Share Entrant 8.4 16.1 0 63 17
Mobile Market Share Entrant 36.7 18.0 0 66 17
Gov. Share Fix Inc. 56.9 38.5 0 100 17
Gov. Share Mob. Inc. 58.5 39.8 0 100 17
# Fix Prov. > 1 47.1 0.514 0 100 17
# Mob. Prov. > 1 100 0 0 100 17
2007 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Fix Investments (m) 820.2 831.3 27.0 2488.2 17
Mobile Investments (m) 1467.8 1446.0 48.3 4178.2 17
Fix Access/Pop. 0.645 0.100 0.440 0.808 17
Mobile Access/Pop. 1.2 0.162 0.902 1.5 17
Rel. Change Fix Lines 2.8 5.8 -7.1 14.6 17
Rel. Change Mobile Lines 7.0 4.0 -4.4 14.4 17
Fix Rev./Acc. 1419.6 712.9 362.9 3235.1 17
Mob. Rev./Acc. 328.5 97.8 185.7 499.3 17
Population (mill.) 23580.2 26341.7 473 82376 17
GDP/Pop. 49593.5 20073.9 21112.1 105065.3 17
Share Urban Population 75.2 11.1 58.9 97.3 17
Long-Run Interest Rate 0.041 0.004 0.029 0.049 16
Fix Market Share Entrant 35.2 10.0 21.2 60 17
Mobile Market Share Entrant 55.3 8.0 41 74 17
Gov. Share Fix Inc. 26.3 28.5 0 100 17
Gov. Share Mob. Inc. 23.4 28.5 0 100 17
# Fix Prov. > 1 100 0 100 100 17
# Mob. Prov. > 1 100 0 100 100 17
period, both strongly increased with upcoming competition. During the first half of the
observation period, incumbents chose prices under weak or no competition. In contrast,
upcoming competition increased customers’ attention, which increased the demand for
services. Moreover, innovative transmission technologies reduced congestion and enabled
higher-quality services on the lines. Combining both infrastructure demand and higher-
quality service enabled a, in total, higher revenue per access in the second half of the
observation period.
Other telecommunication-related variables in Table 1 correspond to upcoming competi-
tion and privatization. As the access to mobile infrastructure markets has been regulated
by licensing from its early beginnings and as multiple licenses have been issued at a very
early point in time, the concentration in mobile infrastructure markets has always been
lower (or at most as high) as in fix-line markets. Concerning competition in fix-line mar-
kets, the 1998 liberalization proves to be much more important as only a few countries
had installed fix-line infrastructure competition before this year. Even today, fix-line
infrastructure access is provided mostly by one operator in European national markets.
This operator is obliged to provide access to its infrastructure, to give access for inter-
connection to its Main Distribution Frame (MDF) or to allow for interconnection in the
street cabinets.17
In line with the liberalization, governmental ownership of former fix-line incumbents
and also of the first mobile operator have been continuously reduced in many countries
leading to special governmental control and voting rights, "Golden Shares". The EC
regularly intervenes to prevent these control and voting rights as they deter the influ-
ence of shareholders in telecommunication companies.
Table 2 provides an overview of the expected estimation outcomes. Taking revenues per
access as a measure for prices (see e.g. Röller and Waverman, 2001), a negative impact
of prices on own demand is usually assumed. Nevertheless, upcoming competition after
2000 resulted in new services and new pricing structures such as bundle offers of mul-
tiple services and infrastructure-access modes, which blur the assumed price-demand
structure. Figure 2 in the appendix provides an impression on this issue. The figure
displays a cross-country consideration for 2007. While I find an on average negative
relationship for mobile markets (R2 = 0.256), no clear-cut results could be drawn for
fix-line markets.18Two ambiguous explanations exist for the effect of prices on infrastruc-
ture provision: Ceteris paribus, a higher price enables infrastructure providers to invest
17Nevertheless, this step to infrastructure competition has been a legal issue in most countries for an
extended period of time after the liberalization and it is also a major problem for high-quality service
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Table 2: Expected Outcomes
Dependent Var. Supply Demand Supply Demand
Revenue/Access - 0 - -/0
Access/Population + +
Access/Population (-1) + +
Liberalization + + + +
Market Share Entrants + + + +
Other Infrastr. Rev./Acc. + + + 0
Other Infrastr. Acc./Pop. (-1) - -
Governmental Share + 0 +/0 0
GDP per population +/0 + +/0 +
Population + 0 + +/-
Share Urban Population - -/0 - -/0
Long-Run Interest Rate - 0 - 0
Fix Infrastructure Mobile Infrastructure
more, thus, increasing infrastructure availability and quality. On the other hand, to
set apart from competitors, service providers demand for higher infrastructure quality.
However, competitive pressure on the service level in combination with access price reg-
ulation (Framework Directive, 2002/21/EC, Article 8) forces providers to choose lower
prices. In line with the literature on telecommunication liberalization, I therefore expect
a negative price effect on infrastructure supply as this second effect should outweigh the
first (Röller and Waverman, 2001, Model (1), Hassett and Kozlikov, 2002; Hassett et al.,
2003).
Lagged demand is assumed to have a positive impact on current demand as the decision
for a new access mode is a singular decision. Thus, if a customer had infrastructure
access in year t − 1 this access is in place also in year t. Moreover, in countries with a
higher demand for infrastructure access also the supply of infrastructure is expected to
be higher, which corresponds to the findings in Röller and Waverman (2001).
The following variables are used as proxies: Market Share Entrants as a proxy for
competition, Other Infrastr. Rev./Acc. as a proxy for cross-infrastructure price effects
and Other Infrastr. Acc./Pop.(−1) as a proxy for cross-infrastructure demand effects.
The remaining assumptions on control variables correspond to the findings from the
literature on infrastructure investments and infrastructure demand.
provision on the infrastructure.
18The positive slope is very low and the R2 is even below 0.05.
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Data Adjustments
While the other information is available in the relevant specification, fix-line and mobile
investments have to be calculated from total investments. Unfortunately, no detailed
investment information is publicly available to separate fix-line from mobile investments
in European telecommunication markets for the period before the market liberalization.
The consideration of a low number of available data points for fix-line infrastructure
investments provides indication of how one could separate fix-line from mobile invest-
ments. Mainly two approaches for the calculation qualify to be equally valuable methods
which are either a measure based on lagged revenues or a measure based on the number
of access lines. For mainly technical reasons, which will be discussed in more detail
below, I use the approach based on access lines. In doing so, fix-line infrastructure in-
vestments are calculated from total investments as the share of fix access lines per total
access lines times total investments:
fix-line inv.t = total investmentst
fix access linest
fix access linest +mob. subscriberst
(3)
and mobile investments as total investments weighted by mobile subscription lines:
mobile inv.t = total investmentst
mob. subscriberst
fix access linest +mob. subscriberst
(4)
Fix-line revenues is a second variable which has to be derived. Nevertheless, this is a mi-
nor challenge as mobile revenues and also total revenues are available from the database.
Thus, fix-line access revenues are calculated as total telecommunication revenues minus
mobile revenues.
5 Estimation Approaches, Results and Discussion
I first derive the estimation approaches taking into account the results of multivariate
specification test.19 Afterwards, I provide the results and discuss them in more detail.
19Further information and results of alternative specification tests are provided in the appendix.
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Estimation Approaches
Equation system (1) and (2) is estimated first assuming independence of both equations
and then taking into account potential structural dependencies by adopting a simultane-
ous estimation approach. In the independent estimation approach, the demand equations
are estimated using the standard Arellano-Bond approach with robust standard errors
and restricting the dependent variable lag structure to 1 (Arellano and Bond, 1991). For
the investment equation, no lag dependence is expected. The derived investment mea-
sures follow a cyclical structure as they are linear transformations of total investments. I
estimate the investment equation using a GLS estimator with random effects controlling
for country differences and assuming a robust variance-covariance matrix taking into
account the Huber-White correction.20
In the independent estimation approach, log(access/pop.) is assumed to be exogenous in
the supply function as this is the standard model structure to explain investments known
from the literature. In contrast, the two-equation estimation takes log(access/pop.) as
an endogenous variable in the investment function and instruments log(access/pop.)
with its one-period lag and, additionally, with the one-period lag of demand for the
other infrastructure when considering cross effects. I estimate the equation system us-
ing an IV-GMM-based approach as it is proposed in Baum et al. (2003) for panel data.
The estimator is a two-step GMM method, in which, firstly, endogenous variables are
estimated on all exogenous variables and, afterwards, the second equation is estimated
taking into account the estimation results of the first step. In contrast to the standard
IV approach, the GMM method is more efficient as it employs the optimal weighting
matrix, which is the inverse of an estimate of the covariance matrix of orthogonality
conditions (Baum et al., 2003). Thus, the standard IV approach uses one particular
weighting matrix out of the set of the alternative GMM weighting matrices.21, 22
20Estimation results are identical to the fixed effects approach except for the constant term.
21Hayashi (2000) provides more detailed information on the construction of the efficient GMM estima-
tor.
22I have also tested the results with heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors but
the estimation results and also their significance levels remain the same.
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Estimation Results and Discussion
Estimation results are provided in Tables 3 and 4. Columns 1 and 3 show the results of
the independent equation estimations. Columns 2 and 4 show the results of the simul-
taneous estimation approach.
Following Hypotheses 1 and 2, a positive effect of service competition both on infras-
tructure supply and infrastructure demand should exist. Based on observations from
other telecommunication markets, the EC expects service competition to provide direct
incentives to increase infrastructure availability and quality as infrastructure providers
are vertically integrated with service providers. In line with the literature, service level
competitors require adequate infrastructure quality to offer their services and to set
apart from each other. In consequence, service competition increases the demand for
infrastructure.
Competition is found to have a significantly positive impact on the demand for fix-line
infrastructure only for the two-equation estimations. In contrast, no direct effect on
investments is found in neither of the specification. However, service competition has a
significantly positive impact on infrastructure demand and also on infrastructure supply
in the mobile estimations.23 Moreover, the demand coefficients are significantly positive
in all simultaneous estimation approaches. In consequence, ignoring the indirect effect
of competition on investments deters the conclusions derived from the estimations re-
sults: Considering fix-line supply and demand (Table 3), the impact of competition on
infrastructure investments would have been completely ignored with the single-equation
model. Turning to mobile supply and demand, the impact of competition on investments
would have been under-estimated without taking into account the indirect effect of com-
petition on the demand variables and, thus, on investments. On the one hand, new
entrants offer existing services at significantly lower prices, which initiates price wars à
la Bertrand. This is supported by the mobile-demand estimation results as mobile ser-
vice provision is strongly tied to the infrastructure provider. However, it is not found for
fix-line access.24 On the other hand, advertising and other professional communication
channels are used to provide more information to customers about innovative services
and forthcoming price reductions and, thus, to increase the interest and the demand
for infrastructure. These findings support the discussion in Plank (2005) that upcoming
23In specification 3a of the mobile estimation approach, the p-value of the competition coefficient is
0.108.
24Please see also the plotted cross-country estimations in Figure 2 in the appendix.
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competition on the service level stimulates the demand for infrastructure as service com-
petition forces companies to provide product information to customers. Based on this
information, customers demand more services and, consequently, directly and indirectly
demand for higher quality infrastructure. Thus, the estimation results support Hypoth-
esis 1 that service competition directly increases investments only partially, for mobile
infrastructure but not for fix-line infrastructure. In contrast, the indirect competition
effect on investments is found in all simultaneous estimation equations both for fix-line
and mobile investments, which is in line with Hypothesis 2.
Cross-effects between infrastructures are taken into account with specifications 3 and 4.
Following Rodini et al. (2003), upcoming mobile availability is a substitute for fix-line
access. In Europe, fix-line infrastructure has been in place at the time when mobile
access became publicly available. Moreover, mobile infrastructure capacity is lagging
behind fix-line capacity. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 states that fix-line infrastructure in-
vestments are the reference when deciding on mobile infrastructure supply and demand
whereas fix-line infrastructure supply and demand are independent from the mobile mar-
ket situation.
While the demand for one infrastructure is independent from the demand for the other,
an ambiguous effect of cross prices exists: mobile prices positively affect fix-line infras-
tructure demand, whereas fix-line prices negatively affect mobile infrastructure invest-
ments. These findings support the idea of a first-mover advantage of fix-line infrastruc-
ture markets over mobile-infrastructure markets: When deciding about an additional
access mode, customers compare the prices of the secondary access option. As long
as mobile infrastructure is comparably expensive, mobile demand is the less preferable
option. Thus, customers choose fix-line access instead of mobile access. In consequence,
in countries where mobile subscription is more expensive, customers increase their avail-
ability by additional fix-line access modes. This has not been a particular issue for
private customers but rather for companies. In contrast, for customers interested in a
fix-line infrastructure access, mobile access is no adequate substitute as in all European
countries mobile access is a lower-quality access in terms of transfer rates.25
25Please note that the observation period covers, to a far extent, the years of introducing mobile
communication and upcoming mobile competition. Today, mobile-to-fix substitutability is probably
significantly higher than ten years ago.
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No significant impact of mobile prices on fix-line infrastructure provision is found. How-
ever, a significantly negative effect of fix-line prices exists on mobile infrastructure sup-
ply. As the upgrade of fix-line backbone infrastructure took place at a time when only
low-quality services like telephony or short messages could technically be transmitted
on the mobile infrastructure, it was a lower-quality substitute to fix-line infrastructure.
Moreover, the upgrade of mobile infrastructure for 3G services occurred at a time when
similar fix-line broadband quality has already been established. Due to this lag of quality
between fix-line and mobile infrastructure, fix-line infrastructure is a stronger substitute
to mobile infrastructure than vice versa. Consequently, fix-line infrastructure market
prices affect mobile infrastructure supply more than the other way around. This finding
is strongly in line with Hamilton (2003) but extends her results also to a data set of
developed countries. Moreover, the results also support the discussion in Rodini et al.
(2003). The estimation results confirm Hypothesis 3: As fix-line infrastructure is the
primary infrastructure available, mobile infrastructure supply and demand depend on
the conditions of fix-line infrastructure availability whereas only weak evidence is found
for the opposite direction.
Let us shortly consider the coefficients of the control variables. A significantly positive
population effect is found for mobile and also for fix-line investments.26 Telecommu-
nications is a social network, i.e. the more customers are available in a network, the
more traffic is provided on the lines, which requires higher investments. Therefore, the
larger the population size, the more infrastructure investments are necessary to cover
this higher traffic.
Per capita GDP has a significantly positive effect both on mobile infrastructure demand
and supply when controlling for cross-infrastructure effects. In contrast, its impact on
fix-line infrastructure demand is, to a far extent, insignificant, whereas it is weakly sig-
nificantly positive for fix-line infrastructure supply. Following the correlation matrix
provided in Table 5 in the appendix a significantly negative correlation exists between
per-capita GDP and mobile demand (-0.73). Dropping per-capita GDP in the demand
equation changes the remaining coefficients only slightly. However, the coefficient of the
GDP variable can hardly be interpreted due to these cross-effects.
Governmental ownership of infrastructure providers has a significantly positive impact
on investments. While it is found to have a positive effect also on demand for fix-line
26Only in the cross-infrastructure estimation, this effect turns weakly insignificant (p-value = 0.127).
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infrastructure for the separate estimations (Columns 1a and 3a), this effect vanishes
with the system estimations. In contrast to profit-maximization aims, governments fol-
low macroeconomic aims with the telecommunication sector. As investments provide a
strong positive externality also on other sectors, which cannot be internalized by the
investors, they would under-invest from a macroeconomic perspective.27 In contrast,
governmental participation forces infrastructure providers to increase investments above
the level optimally from the single company perspective.
Long-term interest rates are used as a measure for the costs of capital as infrastruc-
ture investments are very long-term oriented. However, I find no significant impact of
interest rates on investments. As the correlation analysis provides evidence for strong
correlations between interest rates and other explanatory variables, I excluded interest
rates in other estimation specifications not presented here. However, results remained
very similar. Even significance levels did not change.
In a nutshell, I find service competition to increase infrastructure investments, which
is in line with the literature. However, in particular for fix-line infrastructure, the
competition-impact is not a direct driver of investments. Service competition increases
the demand for infrastructure and, subsequently, increases infrastructure supply. In
contrast to the EC’s expectations, these findings provide first evidence that it is not
necessarily competitive pressure which motivates providers to invest. Moreover, there
must be a sufficient (derived) demand for infrastructure.
With regard to cross-infrastructure effects, I find that mobile infrastructure supply and
demand strongly depend on relative access prices. On the one hand, customers pre-
fer a secondary fix-line access as long as mobile access prices are too high. On the
other hand, mobile infrastructure supply benefits from tougher fix-line infrastructure
competition. However, no reciprocal effects exist. These findings strongly demand
the consideration of both demand and supply and, in particular, cross-infrastructure
interrelationships when analyzing telecommunication infrastructure investments with
competing platforms. While I have focused on a period of comprehensive technologi-
cal improvements in fix-line transmissions and the roll-out of basic and higher-capacity
mobile infrastructure, these issues become even more relevant for fix-line and mobile
broadband analyses as more and more services could be used on both infrastructures
substitutively.
27Please see also Cave (2006a) and the cited literature.
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6 Conclusion and Limitations
Infrastructure availability and adequate quality are the central pre-requisites for higher-
value telecommunication services. In this paper, I considered the driving impact factors
of fix-line and mobile telephony infrastructure investments. In contrast to closed-form
approaches, which are usually taken in the literature, I separated infrastructure supply
from demand. In doing so, it can be analyzed how service competition affects invest-
ments. The analysis is implemented for mobile and fix-line infrastructure separately so
that I can distinguish and compare the results across competitive infrastructures.
As in previous works, I find a significantly positive effect of upcoming service competi-
tion on infrastructure expansion. However, upcoming service competition does not only
directly influence investments, but it particularly increases the demand for infrastruc-
ture which, subsequently, initiates investments. During the transition process of the
liberalization, service market entrants stimulate the demand for new services and, as a
precondition, the demand for infrastructure of higher quality. This "demand pull" is
found for both established fix-line infrastructure and also mobile infrastructure where
competition occurred at an earlier point of the technological development. Therefore,
service competition, as a driver of demand, enables and supports the comprehensive
technological developments, which we have experienced during the last decade.
A political question arising from these findings is how service providers and customers
could be involved in the process of infrastructure roll-out. This is of particular interest
as infrastructure operators currently bear the risk of re-funding investments and, simul-
taneously, provide comprehensive positive externalities for service providers and other
industries. With more service competition but only one or two physical infrastructure
providers in fix-line markets, the challenges for infrastructure providers continuously
aggravate. My results support the proposal in line with the Third Regulatory Package
that service providers and customers should be integrated in the financing process of
infrastructure investments.28 However, the actual way of its implementation is an open
point of discussion for future economic research.
28The EC is aware of the drifting apart of service level profits and infrastructure investments and
therefore proposes that investment risks should be explicitly taken into account by regulators when
obliging local loop access (Directive 2009/140/EC).
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/tomorrow/reform/better_
regulation_directive/st03677_re06.en09.pdf
28
In a next step, I have considered whether cross effects exist between mobile demand
and fix-line demand and also mobile supply and fix-line supply. While other coefficients
remain nearly unaffected, higher mobile prices reduce the demand for mobile infrastruc-
ture and, simultaneously, increase the demand for fix-line infrastructure. In contrast,
fix-line prices do not affect mobile infrastructure demand. As fix-line infrastructure
quality is at each point in time at least as high as mobile infrastructure quality, the
decision for (higher quality) fix-line infrastructure access takes place when there is no
adequate mobile substitute. In contrast, the decision about mobile access occurs when
fix-line infrastructure of similar transmission quality is already available. Therefore,
when deciding on a secondary access to increase availability, customers (in particular
professional users) choose an additional fix-line access if mobile prices are too high.29
Similarly, the provision of mobile infrastructure depends on the situation in the fix-line
market. The higher the market price for fix-line access, the less mobile infrastructure is
provided. While mobile network operators derive their investment decision from fix-line
market competition, fix-line infrastructure supply is independent as no adequate infras-
tructure of comparable quality is installed. These results provide evidence that mobile
infrastructure is always a secondary infrastructure for service provision following fix-
line infrastructure due to the lack of transmission capacity. In contrast, fix-line market
competition directly affects the mobile market situation both in terms of supply and in
terms of demand.
Opening the black box of closed-form investment models allows us to specify results
already known from the literature in more detail and to learn more about the structure
behind the findings. In doing so, this paper provides first evidence that (derived) in-
frastructure demand plays a central role in the roll-out of infrastructure. The situation
of Web 2.0 where customers themselves become active information providers and where
web-based communication turns more and more to peer-to-peer communication will def-
initely foster the demand pull of infrastructure.
From the findings of the analysis of upcoming platform competition, fix-line infrastruc-
ture should be expected to be the first affected by this development. Dependent on
access prices for mobile infrastructure of comparable capacity, mobile investments fol-
low the development.
29Please note again that I consider infrastructure competition between one established platform and
a growing platform. Doing the exercises with current data will provide other results as mobile
infrastructure is completely rolled out at least at a basic level in all EU member states today.
29
Some pitfalls of the analysis should not be ignored: I have considered investments on
the aggregated level in monetary terms. In consequence, even by controlling for country
differences, it cannot be stated that more investments are "better", firstly, as invest-
ments also include doubled lines resulting not necessarily in a reduction of congestion
and, secondly, as no information about existing infrastructure and its quality is available.
Moreover, due to data constraints at the current point in time, I have to accept some
drawbacks with the specification of supply and demand, which have been discussed in
the previous sections and which leave broader room for follow-up studies using a more
structural estimation approach to revise the outcomes of this paper in the future.
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Appendix
Stationarity and Specification Tests
The graphs in Figure 1 let assume non-stationarity of the demand variables and the in-
vestment variables. It is therefore necessary to test for non-stationarity of the dependent
variables to select an estimation specification which takes up the potential challenge or
to adjust the data set. I have employed a panel Dickey Fuller Test, the Multivariate
Augmented-Dickey-Fuller Test (MADF test), as described in Taylor and Sarno (1998)
and in Sarno and Taylor (1998) and the Levin-Lin (-Chu) test presented in Levin et al.
(2002) for considering non-stationarity of the panel as a whole. The MADF test provides
evidence for stationarity of all four time series, investments in fix-line infrastructure, in-
vestments in mobile infrastructure and demand for demand for fix-line infrastructure
and mobile infrastructure. However, following Sarno and Taylor (1998), the MADF test
requires all individual time series of the panel to be stationary. Moreover, the MADF
test is criticized as it provides adequate test results only for a long panel data set, i.e. the
number of periods should comprehensively exceed the number of countries. In contrast,
my data set is a short panel as the number of years (t = 18) does not comprehensively
exceed the number of countries (i = 16). Therefore, I have also employed the Levin-Lin
test to compare the results with those of the MADF test but find similar results.30 As
both test specifications reject the null hypothesis of no stationarity, I use the data set
without further adjustments for the multivariate time-series estimations.
The Arellano-Bond approach performs a linear dynamic panel-data estimation of the
difference in the dependent variable on the differences and the levels of the independent
and the lagged dependent variables. Following Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell
and Bond (1998), it is thus necessary that no higher order correlations exist in the panel
data set. The Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order serial correlation in first-
difference residuals are displayed in Tables 3 and 4.31 While the first-order tests show
ambiguous results, the second-order test results provide evidence that the hypotheses
of no higher-order first-difference autocorrelation cannot be rejected. The test of the
fix-line specifications rejects the hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in contrast
to the test of the mobile specifications. While the second-order test of no autocorrelation
must not be rejected due to the linearity requirement for the estimation specification,
Arellano and Bond (1991) explain that the first-order test results are of minor relevance
for employing the dynamic panel-data estimator.
Time-series estimations are prone to the consideration of over-identification in particu-
lar if an autocorrelated estimation structure is assumed. I employ Hansen’s J test for
system estimations and find evidence for over-identification in the fix-line infrastructure
estimation approach but not in the mobile-infrastructure estimation approach when an-
alyzing cross-infrastructure effects. Over-identification of an endogenous variable means
30While the fix-line infrastructure demand has been found to be non-stationary, the logarithm, which
I employ in the econometric analysis, is stationary at the ten percent significance level.
31Greece has been excluded from the mobile demand estimations due to strong volatility in the depen-
dent variable.
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that its coefficient has no explanatory power as multiple (here two) ways for calculation
exist which might lead to alternative values for the instrumented variable. Following
Wooldridge (2002) the coefficient of the instrumented variable cannot be interpreted.
However, the coefficient product of the instrument and the instrumented variable does
not suffer from the reduced-form coefficient calculation. Thus, while direct effects of the
instrumented variable cannot be used, indirect effects are unbiased.
Price-Demand Interrelation
Figure 2 displays the price-demand interrelation for fix-line and for mobile markets in
2007. While mobile access follows the expected downward slope across the states under
scrutiny, a positive interrelation is found for fix-line markets. However, in contrast to
the mobile situation, the linear demand-curve of the fix-line graph only weakly explains
the price-demand scatter across the countries.
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Figure 2: Price-Demand Relationship in Fix-line and Mobile Markets
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